Fukushima Nuclear Power
Stations I and II
NASA
Satellite
photos [more]
show
devastation in Japan, before and after [March 12]
Nuclear
Disaster Eclipses Three Mile Island
Up to Six Reactors Have Problems [March 16]
New
Power Line to Daichii Nearly Complete
to Run Cooling Pumps, Valves, and Plant
Controls [March 17]
Power Lines Connected
[March 18]
Micro-Helicopter
Videos of Unit #4 April 16
Estimates
of
Exposure Define US Evacuation Zone
[March 25]
Massive Ground Water
Contamination
[May 5]
Three Simultaneous Chernobyls --
Almost [June 1]
Chaos Could
Come with Rice Harvest Season 3/15
plume [July 1]
Meltdown:
What Really Happened at Fukushima?
[July 2]
Prof
Tatsuhik
Kodama, Tokyo U. "What Are You Doing"
[July
28]
The
Explosive
Truth Behind Fukushima's Meltdown
[August 17[
Why
Radiatioactive
Isotopes Continue to Spread to Tokyo
[October 27]
Encrusted
Salt
Buildup in Reactor #1 & 2
BWR
Design
Flaws [Sept 1]
GE
Hitachi:
35 US Reactors Could Fail in Quake [Sept 30]
Fukushima
Plant
Status Report, Nov 2011
Fukushima,
Total Cost [Dec 2011]
Fukushima
Health Issues and Nuclear Proponents NRC, AEC, IAEA [Feb 2, 2012]
New
Containment Flaw Identified in BWR Mark 1 [Feb 6,
2012]
A
Pool Crack, rather than Pool Collapse, Can Be the End of
Tokyo [Mar 10, 2012]
Fukushima:
The Crisis Is Not Over [Mar 10, 2012]
German
TV: Armageddon if Spent Fuel Pool #4 Collapses [Mar 25, 2012]
Gundersen:
Kansai Presentation on Pellets Scrattering [May 13,
2012]
Daiichi Tsunami Horror Daiichi Worker Stories
Tourists
Health
Effects from Acute Radiation Exposure [2] [chart]
Fukushima 1 Daiichi Power
Station
Fukushima 2 Daini Power Station
stable
Fukushima
1 Daichii BWR Design
Active
vs
Passive Backup Reactor Cooling
Japan's Incompatible Power
Grids [50 hz and 60 hz]
Fukushima
Nuclear
Accident Update Log [full]
Before
quake,
Japan's Nuclear Plant was a Source of Hope
Tsunami
Warnings
Written in Stone, Saved Some
Video from Car trapped in Tsunami
Fukushima's
Hawaii
Girls on Tour to Promote Safety of Resort
Fukushima
on
the Mississippi
Related:
The
Bomb Plant [MOX fabrication facility]
Borax
Safety Experiment on a BWR part1
part2
[explosion
similar to Daiichi SFP #3]
Fukushima
Daiichi NUclear Power Station Video Tour
Battle
of
Chernobyl
After
the
Nuclear Apocalypse
[relevant movie]
Fukushima
Wind
and Temperature Forecast
Live
Streaming NHK World TV [English]
Outside the Daiici
plant as the tsunami flood swept arouind the complex [before]
Daiichi Reactor Units
#1 to #4 (right to left) after disaster,
showing the effect of massive hydrogen gas explosions in #3
and #4,
and a severe, but lesser explosion in #1
Power was restored to the Control Rooms for Units #3 and #4, but
not the instrumentation. Engineers were attempting to reactivate the monitoring
systems, including those for measuring temperature of the fuel
rods, radiation levels, water level within reactor and spent
fuel pools, and valve open/closed condition! So how did
the control room workers monitor the plant, if most of their
instrumentation was dead? [3-22]
Not surprisingly, plutonium Pu-238, 239, 240 was found in soil
in five locations at the Daiichi power plant. All three
isotopes have long half-lives, with plutonium-23 taknig 24,000
years to lose half its radioactivity, Pu-238 87 years, and
Pu-240 more than 6,500 years. [3-21-22]
From the incident standpoint, how did the workers jury-rig fire
hoses to cool the damaged reactors? News reports described
fire pumps were used to inject sea water into the
reactors. No mention of ordinary fire hoses being
used. The utility never stated whether water poured onto
the reactors and spent fuel pools were allowed to drain as
contaminated, radioactive water directly into the Pacific Ocean,
or to flood the sub-floors of the reactor buildings.
Somehow, workers were able to force sea water into the piping
system.
Radiation levels at greater distances from the plant are being
reported. On March 24, the Japan government detected 1,400
microsieverts at a distance of 30 km (18.6 mi) from the plant.
Japanese officials began quietly encouraging people to evacuate
a larger swath of territory around the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
plant on Friday, a sign that they hold little hope that the
crippled facility will soon be brought under control. The
authorities said they would now assist people who want to leave
the area from 12 to 19 miles outside the crippled plant and said
they were now encouraging “voluntary evacuation” from the area.
Those people had been advised March 15 to remain indoors, while
those within a 12-mile radius of the plant had been ordered to
evacuate.
The United States has recommended that its citizens stay at
least 50 miles away from the plant.
Smoke from Unit #3 in middle, Unit #2 (l.), Unit #4 (r.) taken
from roof of
Unit #2 turbine-generator building. Smoke particulates
for burning spent fuel
include plutonium-239, strontium-90, cesium-137, yttrium-91,
and iodine-137.
Current concerns on March 25.
- Unit #1: plant stabilized since building
explosion and damage. pressures and temperatures
continue to fluctuate. Begin fresh water injection
into reactor and spent fuel pool. cooling system
inoperable. building severely damaged by initial
explosion. lighting restored.
- Unit #2: reactor vessel likely cracked, venting
radioactive gases into the sky; cooling pumps damaged beyond
repair, need replacement, could take weeks. Plan to
inject fresh water into reactor and spent fuel pool.
building only slightly damaged. 200-300
millisieverts/hr inside the plant (250 mSv/year allowed for
workers). control room lighting restored, but no
power for monitoring instrumentation.
- Unit #3: reactor contains plutonium fuel load;
reactor
temp
reached 572 F (300 C), stabilized. three
electrical workers contaminated by radiowater water in
basement. pressure being maintained, less likely
to have cracked vessel. building severely
damaged by initial explosions. fresh water being
pumped into reactor. fresh water pumped in by
Sunday March 27 for spent fuel pool. [video]
- Unit #4: spent fuel pool likely dry, fuel
overheated and damaged, releasing radioactivity into the
sky. concrete pump truck dumping sea water into spent
fuel pool. reactor water level and pressure ok.
fresh water pumped in by Sunday March 27
for spent fuel pool.
- Unit #5: spent fuel pool temperature reduced
from 65 C to 37 C, toward normal 25 C. cooling pumps
for reactor and spent fuel pool operable. three holes
punched in exterior building to prevent hydrogen gas
explosion.
- Unit #6: spent fuel pool temperature reduced
from 65 C to 41 C, toward normal 25 C. cooling pumps
for reactor and spent fuel pool operable. three holes
punched in exterior building to prevent hydrogen gas
explosion.
The seismic chart left shows the huge magnitude and
duration
of the earthquake, when compared to the 1995 Hanshin
Earthquake.
Chart at right shows tsunami travel times across the Pacific.
After the quake, the reactors had automatically shutdown.
Off-site power too had snapped. The generators managed to
provide power for about an hour when the 10-meter tsunami
reached the plant, breached the seawall, swept away the diesel fuel tanks
and drowned the generators. This led to a critical condition
called "station blackout". March 23 reports from the
Japan government estimated the tsunami wave as high as 77 feet
(not saying where).
Analysis emerging
now shows that there were 13
diesel
generators installed in a below-ground bunker near the
seawall protecting the nuclear plant from the ocean.
Diesel fuel was reportedly stored in tanks built on the sea
front to facilitate easy unloading from ships, and perhaps in
storage tanks located near the diesel generator bunkers.
TEPCO indicated the rooms that house those backup generators are
fairly watertight.
The before-after photo at the right shows the location
for
two diesel fuel tanks. The two tanks are located
right at waters edge, protected only by a small rock dike.
There were likely other fuel tanks located adjacent to the
underground bunkers where the diesel generators
resided. Much plant equipment appears to be missing
after the tsunami. The reactor building is set back 100
meters from the ocean, behind the turbine-generator
buildings. The plant
designers
flawed assumption was that the seawall would fully protect
the fuel tanks, electrical switching banks, and below ground
bunkers in which the diesel generators resided.
The plant was designed to ride out a
tsunami, but the one which struck was beyond that design
limit. Fukushima was designed with a 5.7 meter (18.7
ft). The seawall appears to be the large breakwater,
surrounding the trapezoid shaped lagoon. The lagoon would
absorb the overflow, and prevent flow onto the low lying plant
site. The initial shock wave for a large water surge would hit
the seawall at 500 mph, and force the water up and over the
breakwater. An 18 foot tsunami could overflow the 18 foot
seawall. Wave speed was estimated by transit time to
California in 10 hours for 5000 miles distance. If not computers and dynamic analysis in late 1960s,
difficult computation for that decade, water tank simulation
could have demonstrated the seawall limitations.
On March 22, TEPCO revised estimated of the tsunami that hit
Daiichi to 14 meters, or 46 feet, based on height of water
markings on the buildings. To fully inhibit an initial
wave and subsequent tsunami tide might have required a 75 foot
seawall, to allow the main lagoon to dissipate the initial
surge, and allow an equally tall secondary breakwater to stop
the tsunami. There is an elevated plateau right
behind the plant, which would have been a better location for
the plant.
Japan
has
suffered 195 tsunamis since 400, according to Japan’s
Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, which
produced a report on tsunami threats to nuclear plants on the
opposite coast to Dai-Ichi in July 2008. Three in the past three
decades had waves of more than 10 meters. A 7.6-magnitude
quake in 1896 off the east coast of Japan created waves as high
as 38 meters, while an 8.6- magnitude temblor in 1933 led to a
surge as high as 29 meters, according to the U.S. Geological
Survey.
There is high residual heat in the
cores even after shutdown, sufficient to boil off 300 tonnes of
water every day. So water needs to be pumped in continuously to
cool the core. Pumps do this, but they need power. That is
why, standby generators are needed.Keeping the generators at low
levels has been criticized by experts in nuclear design.
TEPCO managing director Akio Komori admitted that the elevation
of the backup generators was a potential issue of inquiry.
After the generators failed, a third
backup of battery power kicked in. But it had capacity of
supplying DC power for just 8 hours to operate the valves in the
Reactor Core Isolated Cooling (RCIC) system. When the
batteries ran out, the reactors and storage pools were
effectively without cooling water, causing heat build up,
potential corrosion of fuel rods, production of hydrogen and its
explosions, etc.
Some nuclear plants in the US, have Fukushima type design, but
they keep the generators in watertight stalls with 30-centimeter
thick concrete walls. Experts say that the Fukushima
reactors are the Mark I type with 'active' cooling systems, that
is, based on power driven flow of water. Later, models
have 'passive' cooling systems that are not dependent on power.
The TVA
in
Tennessee has equipment similar to that which failed in
Japan, but with some differences that are very important.
For example, TVA's Browns Ferry plant, near Athens, Ala., also
has emergency diesel generators, but they are in flood-protected
buildings with watertight doors. Each generator has a seven-day
fuel supply that is buried underground, as are the wiring and
breaker panels for the generators. To address the
potential hydrogen build-up problem, in the mid-19802 the Browns
Gerry plants were fitted with a "hardened" vent system that
channeled hydrogen outside the containment to be dispersed into
the air. Better to disperse, than blowing up the outer
building.
Radiation
spewed
from the reactor in a meltdown might rise to as high as
500 meters (1,640 feet). The Chernobyl explosion sent
radioactive dust 30,000 feet high and continued for
months. Since the outer, Secondary Containment buildings
are heavily damaged, the areas above the spent fuel pools are
well ventilated. Hence, should the spent fuel continue to
overheat, and zirconium cladding overheat, the hydrogen released
from the uranium will should not explode. Should the catch
zirconium fires, smoke can carry particulates of highly
radioisotopes into the atmosphere, particularly cesium and
plutonium, along with strontium and iodine.
The
situation
is unstable. Video describes situation in plain
English: Michio Kaku, quantum physicist, author "Physics
of the Future"] The credibility of TEPCO has melted down,
as the utility says the situation is under control, i.e. if one
considers hanging on to the abyss by your fingernails. The
pictures do not lie. The crane used to lift and move fuel
rods from the reactor to the spent fuel spool is clearly
visible. You should not be able to see the crane from
outside the plant! [see
crane photos before and after]
Situation
is
grave. Prime Minister Naoto Kan said the crisis
remains "very grave", as forecasts indicated changing winds
could start moving radiation closer to Tokyo by the end of the
weekend. 3-18-2011
Result
after dumping initial water into reactor buildings on March
17. Chopper
crews
flew missions of about 40 minutes each to limit their
radiation exposure, passing over the reactor with loads of about
2,000 gallons (7,500 liters) of water. Another 9,000 gallons
(35,000 liters) of water were blasted from military trucks with
high-pressure sprayers used to extinguish fires at plane
crashes, though the vehicles had to stay safely back from areas
deemed to have too much radiation. Special police units
with water cannons were also tried, but they could not reach the
targets from safe distances and had to pull back.
Kyodo
reported 64 tons of water were dumped on the Units #3 and
#4 via helicopter and fire cannons on fire trucks, to cool the
spent fuel rods in the spent fuel pool (probably empty of
water). Efforts were halted due to high radiation levels,
which instead of decreasing, had increased from 3,700 to 4,000
microsieverts per hour. Radiation level are likely too
high for both fire trucks as well as helicopter pilots.
Smoke was also observed coming from Unit #2, indicating the fuel
rods in its spent fuel pool was burning as well.
Considering that 700 tons of water would be needed to
barely cover the tops of fuel rods in an empty pool, the initial
water dumped into the plants will cool the rods by direct
contact on the way to the bottom of the pool. Its quite possible the water is leaking out as
fast as water is being shot in. But TEPCO has yet to
concede the spent fuel pool is cracked and leaking water in Unit
#3. Photos of Unit #3 after the explosion show the
horrific damage to the steel frame, not just upper walls blown
off, but the upper steel frame mangled and two entire walls from
the containment blown away. The spent fuel pool could not
have completely dried up after a couple days, from having simply
lost its recirculation pumps. Unit #3's pool dried up much
faster than the other reactor pools.
As of 10 p.m. local time on Thursday in Japan (Wed PT),
the JAIFl listed the following
status
of the six Fukushima reactors:
• Reactor Buildings #1, #3 and #4: "severely
damaged"; #2: "slightly damaged";
• Cooling was not working for Reactors #1, #2
or #3;
• Reactor #2 water levels covering >50%; in
#1 & #3 water levels covered ~50% of fuel.
• Structural integrity of spent fuel pools
unknown for Reactors #1 and #2;
• Reactors #3 & #4: low water
levels; spent fuel pool in #4 at dangerously high 85 C.
• Spent fuel pool temperature rising
for Reactors #5 and #6 to 65C.
The photo at left shows one fire truck shooting the water cannon
to the plant roof, hoping to dump water into the spent fuel
pool. Seven fire trucks were used, one at a time due to
access limitations near the reactor. This was taken on
Friday local time. They hoped to shoot 50 tons into the
reactor. Given the volume and tonnage of water required to
fill a mostly empty pool, its difficult to fathom how the pool
can be filled with ongoing boil off of water.
On Friday and Saturday, the fire trucks are continuing to dump
water into the reactors, using an unmanned fire truck and 2500
ft hose.
On March 19, fire trucks shot over 2000 tons of water
into spent fuel #3, in a late night mission that lasted over 13
hours. [Calculation: the fire hose is rated at 750
gallons per minute, i.e. 100 ft3/min = 6250 lb/min,
or ~3 tons/min. Hence, 2000 tons would require 667 min =
11 hours with no down time. This would be enough water to
at least cover the fuel, since 1400 tons are required to raised
an empty pool to just cover the fuel to depth of 15 feet.]
By March 20, the spent fuel pools in Unit #5 and #6 had been
reduced from 65 C to 37 C and 41 C, resp., back toward the
desired 25 C temperature. The pool at Unit #4 continues to
run very hot, as there is little or no water, with a potential
leak in its pool.
On March 20, the government stated the entire Fukushima Daiichi
complex would be scrapped once the emergency is resolved.
The
spent fuel pools are of significant concern. Used fuel rods also contain radioactive isotopes:
plutonium-239, strontium-90, cesium-137, and iodine-131.
These are more
dangerous than new fuel rods.
On March 24, Japan's government says the detection of
radioactive neutron beams 15 times near the plant following the
destruction by the tsunami were natural events and there is no
evidence
any uranium and plutonium leaked from reactors.
What Hilary
Thinks. In a confused statement
that confounded nuclear experts, Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton said Friday morning that U.S. Air Force planes in
Japan had delivered "coolant" to a nuclear power plant affected
by the quake. Nuclear reactors do not require special
coolants, only large amounts of pumped water.
"They have very high engineering standards, but one of their
plants came under a lot of stress with the earthquake and didn't
have enough coolant," she said, "and so Air Force planes were
able to deliver that."
Though the boiling water reactor has already been turned
off by inserting neutron-absorbing control rods all the way into
the core, adding boric acid or, more likely, sodium polyborate
would turn the reactor more off than off — which could come in
really handy in the event of a subsequent coolant loss, which
reportedly has already happened. But that’s a $1 billion kill
switch that most experts wouldn’t think to pull. Its use would indicate the nuclear threat is even worse
than presently being portrayed in the news, and lost hope of
keeping those cooling pumps on. Eventually they’ll vent the now
boron-laced coolant to the atmosphere to keep containment
pressures under control. Sodium polyborate, by the way, is
something you might use around the house, since it is the active
ingredient in most flea and tick treatments.
The US
Navy
two weeks later delivered a 500,000 gallons of fresh water
via barges from US naval base at Yokosuka. The fresh water
will dissolve and wash the salt buildup from the reactor cores,
since salt crystals on the fuel rods would inhibit cooling.
Status of the six nuclear reactors on Wed March 17 US. San
Jose Mercury News, March 16, 2011.
Immediate Risk to North
America Currently Low. Radioactive particles
from the earlier explosions pose low risk to North America, and
should
fall
into the Pacific before reaching the West Coast.
“Such a long time spent over water will mean that the vast
majority of the radioactive particles will settle out of the
atmosphere or get caught up in precipitation and rained
out. It is highly unlikely that any radiation capable of
causing harm to people will be left in the atmosphere after
seven days and 2000-plus miles of travel distance.”
Tsunami Wave. Although
the 10 meter height of the tsunami wave seems imaginable, in
1896 the Sanriku tsunami towered to 15 meters, nearly 50 feet
and killing 27,000 people. In one village, the tsunami
wave was estimated at 20 meters.
Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station Layout
Fukushima's Hawaii
girls go on tour in Japan to promote the safety of
their Spa Resort Hawaiians, just 28 miles from the
Daiichi power station
Good References:
All
Things Nuclear
Brad's Blog
8390 Japan
nuclear plant emergencies, March 11
8391
Explosion rocks Fukushima 1, March 12
8392 View
from within the Tsunami, March 13
8393 New
explosion at Unit #2, March 14
8394 PM
addresses the nation, fire at unit #4, blast at unit #2, March
14
8395 Green
News report, March 15
8396 Smoke
billows from unit #3, workers evacuated, March 15
8397 UK and
France warn citizens to get out of Tokyo, March 16
8398 Could
not delay, helicopter drop water onto reactors, March 16
8401 TEPCO
release footage of reactor; helicopter water drops, water cannon
fails, March 17
8403
Renewed Worries for Nuclear Chain Reaction, March 18
MSNBC.com
42161238
Few
options for dealing with nuke emergency
42120956
Rachel
Maddow offers a coherent understanding of concern for spent fuel
pools
How much radioactive material is at the Fukushima
plant.
Fukushima
Daiichi
and Daini Plant Status, 13:00 15 Mar 2011
Layman's
Introduction
to Radiation Doses Radiation Dose Chart
Tsunami
Destruction
of Tarou [video] protected by 10 m Seawall requiring
30 years to construct.
Technical Discussion of the Japanese Nuclear Emergency
All
Things Nuclear RSS
Possible
cause
for hydrogen leaking into containment
Possible
cause
for reactor building explosions
Where
did
water in spent fuel pools go?
Special Considerations for BWR/PWR Facilities Reactor
Safety Course R-800
Chronological
fact sheet on 2011 Crisis at Fukushima Nuclear Power
Plant (pdf)
Marks
to Market: America's Nuclear Time Bombs
2-28-2012
BBC Documentary
Arnie Gundersen videos & transcripts
releases
New
Containment Flaw Identified in the BWR Mark 1 2-9-2012
At Unit #1, the containment pressure rose to 125 lb/in2,
and then subsided back to around 100 lb/in2. This indicates
the containment head had lifted off by stretching of the 180
containment head bolts, allowing hydrogen gas to leak directly
into the building. Just before the explosion, steam was
being vented from the stack, showing the vent was open. Yet
the explosion still occurred. Why? Hydrogen gas was
leaked directly into the building, and the vent was of no
consequence.
TEPCO
Believes Mission Accomplished & Regulators Allow
Radioactive Dumping in Tokyo Bay 12-29-2011
Plans are to dilute radioactive debris from the site to reduce to
accepted levels, then burn. This will simply re-release a
large amount of radioactive particles back into the atmosphere,
while the radioactive ash is dumped into the bay. The
environment will continue to be polluted, and spread across the
country into the ocean.
Hydrogen
buildup at Fukushima? What does it mean & why does it
happen? 11-16-2011
Simple experiment to illustrate hydrogen deflagration.
New TEPCO Photographs
Substantiate Significant Damage to Fukushima Unit 3
10-19-2012 Unit #3 explosion started in the spent
fuel pool, evidenced by roof being
blown away over the pool. Steam plumes from the center of
the building points to the containment being damaged. The
thick concrete floor and walls of the spent fuel focused the
explosion upwards, spewing its nuclear fuel up to 2 miles from the
plant. The explosion at Unit #3 was a denotation, not a
deflagration, as evidenced by the shock wave moving at ~1000 mph,
i.e. supersonic. This speed is required to toss such fuel
pellets up to 2 miles distance. This shock wave damaged the
adjacent Unit #4 building structure, which is not designed to
handle shock waves.
Identifies
Safety Problems in all Reactors Designed Like Fukushima
9-19-2012 The nuclear industry are
using a flawed cost benefit computer code that underestimates the
value of human life and minimize property damages after an
accident, which has the effect of justifying continued operation
of reactors without safety modifications. To open the vent
manually (since electricity had failed) required a human to go
into the radioactive containment, and turn a massive valve handle
200 turns! A series of teams are required to manually open a
single valve. The 60+ holes in all BWR reactor vessel bottom
for control rods creates an easy path for melted fuel to penetrate
the vessel, unlike a pressurized water reactor.
Why
Fukushima Can Happen Here: What the NRC and Nuclear Industry
Dont Want You to Know 7-10-2012
Good engineering description of how the major safety systems were
supposed to work. Unit #1 had an isolation condenser to
absorb excess pressure from the reactor. With power out, a
large valve to the condenser was opened to relieve pressure, but
as pressure and temperature were dropping too fast to control
cooling rates to accepted levels, the valve was closed
again. Reactor vessel pressure rose again, opening safety
valves when dump steam at preset pressures to the torus-shaped
suppression pool below the reactor. This is a one-way path,
steam is cooled by water in the suppression chamber, but make-up
water is not resent to the reactor. Water level within the
reactor drops, exposing the nuclear fuel barring any other source
of makeup water. Eventually, fire hoses were connected to
dump sea water into the reactor vessel to cool the fuel. Sea
water has a problem being high corrosive, and salt buildup will
prevent cooling water from cooling the fuel rods.
Current
Condition of Reactors, TEPCO Claim of "No Fission" in Fuel
Pool, and Lack of Radiation Monitoring in Fish
4-18-2011 Early pressure data showed unusually
high internal pressure within Unit #1 containment. Recall
the Mark I containment head will lift at 100 psi internal
pressure, leaking hydrogen gas into the main building. TEPCO
suggests radioactive iodine found in Unit #4 pool came from the
sky, i.e. explosion at Units #1, #3, and then #2. But Unit
#4 roof is still intact, so is not plausible. Perhaps, there
was nuclear fission with Unit #4 spent fuel pool to cause the
radioactive iodine.
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